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Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era:  
Domestic and International Comparison  
of Enforcement Practices for Laws Requiring  
Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents 
 
By Katherine C. Pearson1 
Professor of Law 
The Pennsylvania State University 
The Dickinson School of Law 
 
Abstract 
 
Family responsibility and support laws have a long but mixed history.  When 
first enacted, policy makers used such laws to declare an official policy that 
family members should support each other, rather than draw upon public 
resources.  This article tracks modern developments with filial support laws that 
purport to obligate adult children to financially assist their parents, if indigent or 
needy.  The author diagrams filial support laws that have survived in the 21st 
Century and compares core components in the United States (including Puerto 
Rico) and post-Soviet Union Ukraine.  While the laws are often similar in 
wording and declared intent, this article demonstrates that enforcement practices 
are quite different among the two countries, even as both countries struggle with 
aging populations and recession.  In addition, the author analyzes a potentially 
disturbing trend emerging in at least two U.S. states, most significantly 
Pennsylvania, where filial support laws are now a primary collection tool for 
nursing homes, with decisions against adult children running to thousands of 
dollars in retroactive “support.”  The article closes with concerns for policy 
makers in any state or country considering filial support as an alternative or 
supplement to public funding for long-term care or health care for the elderly.   
 
I. Introduction 
 In the United States, financial obligations under family law are primarily a matter for the 
states rather than the federal government and the rules are usually provided by specific state 
                                                     
1 My deep appreciation and gratitude go to Professor William E. Butler, for his translations from Ukrainian to 
English of the Ukrainian Family Code, and to Dr. Nataliya Davydova, Visiting Scholar at the Pennsylvania State 
University, for providing key research and translation assistance for Ukrainian cases.  In addition, I am indebted to 
Penn State Law students, Matthew McDonald (Class of 2014), Joshua Veith (Class of 2014), Kacie Coughlin (Class 
of 2012) and Shauna Haney (Class of 2013), for their important research and support.   
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statutes, rather than common law. All fifty states have statutes that obligate certain adults to care 
for or financially support certain other family members.2  For example, state laws in the United 
States routinely provide for awards of alimony among divorced or separated spouses (“spousal 
support”) and obligate noncustodial parents to pay support for their minor-aged children (“child 
support”).3  In addition, in some instances, parents can also be obligated to pay support for adult-
aged children, although usually that obligation is tied to a continuing disability that preexisted 
age 18, the usual age of emancipation.4    
When asked by colleagues working in Ukraine to write an article on U.S. family law for 
Ukrainian lawyers and academics, the author recognized this was an opportunity to analyze an 
additional category of support obligation laws that exist in some but not all U.S. states, and to 
compare these state laws to Ukrainian law.5   State laws that obligate adult children to support 
their parents are sometimes called “parental support,” “family responsibility,” “family support,” 
or “filial support” laws and the latter title will be used in this article.   Slightly more than half of 
the American states (plus Puerto Rico, a U.S. territory) have statutes that in theory can be used to 
require adult children to provide financial support for their parents.  
The current filial support statutes in the U.S. can be traced back in time to poverty 
measures in the first American colonies and, earlier, to the system of “Poor Laws” enacted 
during the 16th century reign of Queen Elizabeth in England.6  At one time as many as forty-five 
of the fifty U.S. states had filial support statutes.7 In some instances, the laws created mutual 
financial assistance obligations, not only among adult children and parents, but also to and from 
grandparents.8  England repealed its filial support provisions (requiring children to “relieve and 
                                                     
2 Homer H. Clark, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES Chapters 6, 16, 17 (2d Ed., West 
Publishing Co. 1988). 
3 Homer H. Clark, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 443-56 (2d Ed., West Publishing Co. 
1988) (discussing jurisdiction for divorce, alimony and child support). 
4 E.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 841 So. 2d 484  (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding there is a common law right of 
support for a dependent adult child, disabled since his minority).  See also Buhai, Sande L., Parental Support of 
Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 710, 725-26 (2007). 
5 This article is an expansion on an article titled “Filial Support Laws in the United States and Ukraine: A Modern 
Comparison of Laws Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents,” to be published in the Ukrainian 
language in  ____[insert publication data when available]. 
6 43 Eliz. c. 2, 2 Eng. Stat. at L.702, sec. 7.  See also Carleson v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 100 Cal. 
Rptr. 635, 643 (Cal. 3 Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (tracing  the statutory origins of California’s public policy on filial 
support), opinion vacated by Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490 (Cal. 1973);  Buhai, Sande L., Parental 
Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 710, 713 (2007). 
7 Terrance A. Kline, A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in Modern Society?, 26 FAMILY LAW 
QUARTERLY 195, 196 (1992). 
8 The statutory language involving grandparents was largely repealed in the mid-Twentieth Century. E.g., Com. Ex 
rel. Bradley v. Bradley, 146 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (discussing 1948 amendment to Pennsylvania law 
eliminating support obligations for grandparents). See also Kermit L. Hall, William M. Wiecek, & Paul Finkelman,  
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 45-46 (2d Ed., Oxford Univ. Press. 1996); Walter I. Trattner, FROM POOR LAW TO 
WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 11 (6th Ed., Free Press, 1999).  
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maintain” their parents) entirely in 1948.9  As this article explains, many U.S. states also 
repealed filial support statutes as Medicaid became the dominant focus of poor relief. 
This article begins with analysis of a typical, surviving filial support statute in the U.S. 
and compares it to filial support laws in Ukraine (Section II). Next, this article compares current 
usages of the laws, looking at the majority trend in the U.S. and sample cases in Ukraine (Section 
III).10  To assist readers in identifying the varying state discussions of filial support, the author 
provides a table of filial support laws currently on the books in U.S. states, as well as citations to 
U.S. cases discussing application. 11 
Despite a lengthy history of U.S. laws that purport to mandate support for indigent 
parents, enforcement of the surviving filial support laws against adult children in the United 
States is rare in modern times, especially as compared to enforcement of minor child or spousal 
support laws.  Public benefit systems became the dominant focus for relief of the aged (Section 
IV), with states struggling to resolve questions about individual eligibility and family 
obligations, particularly whether to mandate any obligation for families to reimburse the public 
purse.  Within the last fifty years (from the 1960s forward), a time during which enforcement of 
child support and spousal support laws increased substantially, enforcement of filial support laws 
waned, with surviving laws largely ignored, both by individual citizens and courts in the United 
States.   
As one commentary observes in discussing family support provisions contained in early 
legislative efforts to address poverty in America, “[t]here was nothing gentle or humane about 
the colonial poor laws by the standards of the late twentieth century.  Over all of them hung the 
odor of moral disapproval.”12  And yet there may be new reasons for American courts to be 
called upon to enforce filial support laws.13 “Baby boomers” (persons born during the Post-
World War II baby boom, between 1946 and 1964) have begun to reach their senior years, 
potentially posing a huge need for expensive health and long-term care, especially dementia-
related care. 14 The U.S. National Institute of Health estimates there are now 5 million Americans 
                                                     
9 National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 29, preamble (Eng.) (repealing filial support and other 
provisions) (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/29/introduction). 
10 For comparative purposes, Ukraine’s physical size, 603,550 square kilometers, is roughly equivalent to the size of 
Texas (696,200 square kilometers), the second largest state in the U.S.  The population of Ukraine, estimated in 
2012 as 45.8 million, is approximately 15% of the total U.S. population (313 million). U.S. Department of State, 
Background Note: Ukraine (June 5, 2012, 2:45 p.m.), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3211.htm.        
11 See attached Table. 
12 Kermit L. Hall, William M. Wiecek, & Paul Finkelman, AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 46 (2d Ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press. 1996) 
13 Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations, 9 JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
POLICY, 709, 720-22 (2001) (discussing the respective merits of opposing arguments for the enforcement of filial 
responsibility laws). 
14 Long-Term Care: Aging Baby Boom Generation Will Increase Demand and Burden on Federal and State 
Budgets, General Accounting Office Testimony before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, (Statement of 
David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States on March 21, 2002( (available at   
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02544t.pdf). 
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with Alzheimer’s disease, an amount that could more than double by 2050.15 What role should a 
family’s resources play in age-related care in the 21st Century and should contribution be 
mandated? 
Health care costs and long-term care costs for older adults are factors not well captured 
by traditional measures of poverty used for younger persons. One report predicts that more than 
sixteen percent of the 38 million Americans over age 65 may already need financial assistance 
under a more realistic, revised poverty formula.16   Thus, the demographics of aging citizens, the 
associated potential for costly long-term care, and the economic recession that began in 2008, 
combine to trigger new consideration of ways to finance age-related care, and for some policy 
makers this includes reconsideration of filial support laws.  Indeed, as set forth in Section V of 
this article, case reports and news reports from Pennsylvania demonstrate a potentially 
significant trend, where third-party creditors are using filial support laws to compel payment or 
cooperation by adult children to cover their parents’ costs in nursing homes or similar care 
settings.  While the Pennsylvania trend is echoed in at least one other state, South Dakota, 
Section VI of this article demonstrates that a lack of national consensus in application of filial 
support laws can create inconsistent results among U.S. states, which may increase the potential 
for results that seem surprising or unfair.   
At Section VII, the author returns to comparisons of enforcement practices in the U.S. 
and Ukraine laws. The seemingly systematic approach of Ukraine, a post-Soviet Union country 
faced with daunting financial demands, contrasts sharply with the inconsistent, and at times 
dramatic, examples of enforcement in the U.S., and the comparison suggests concerns for future 
decision-makers in both countries.    
II. Comparison of U.S. and Ukrainian Filial Support Laws Affecting Duties of 
Adult Children to Parents 
 In the United States, the filial support law of Virginia is typical of the surviving civil laws 
that have their roots in colonial times. The Virginia statute, codified at Virginia Code Annotated 
Section 20-88, opens with a broad statement of duty and scope, providing that “It shall be the … 
duty of all persons eighteen years of age or over, of sufficient earning capacity or income, after 
reasonably providing for his or her own immediate family, to assist in providing for the support 
and maintenance of his or her mother or father, he or she being then and there in necessitous 
                                                     
15 Health and Human Services Press Room, We Can’t Wait: Administration Announces New Steps to Fight 
Alzheimer’s Disease, National Institute on Aging (May 25, 2012, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.nia.nih.gov/newsroom/2012/02/we-cant-wait-administration-announces-new-steps-fight-alzheimers-
disease. 
16 Kathleen Short, The Research Supplemental Poverty Measure, 2010 Report, Figure 1 (2011) available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/methodology/supplemental/research.html. 
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circumstances.”17  The statute goes on to provide courts with the power to determine and order 
payment, including allocating contributions among several children.18   
Virginia’s statute permits the adult child to raise a defense based on “substantial evidence 
of desertion, neglect, abuse or willful failure” by the parent to support the child as a minor.19  In 
addition to civil liability for support payments, the statute provides that an adult child who 
violates an order requiring support for the parent is liable for a misdemeanor crime.20   
Virginia’s law was amended in the 1970s and 80s to restrict primary filial responsibility 
if the parent became eligible for public benefits under Medicaid, while permitting the state the 
option of seeking reimbursement from a child or children for “a parent receiving such assistance 
or services . . . as the court may determine to be reasonable.”21 The reimbursement potential was 
capped in Virginia, providing that “children shall in no case be responsible for such costs for 
more than sixty months of institutionalization.”22  
The structure of the Virginia statute can be seen as a fairly typical example of surviving 
filial support laws found in several U.S. states.23  There are at least seven important components 
that should be (but are not always) addressed by the surviving statutes:   
(1) a general statement of obligation of the adult child to the parent (which may or may 
not be reciprocal);  
(2) language establishing grounds for financial liability (such as Virginia’s grounds, the 
parent’s “necessitous circumstances” or Pennsylvania’s undefined “indigent” status);24  
(3) a provision prioritizing liability among several children or other obligors (such as 
Virginia’s language providing obligated parties shall “jointly  and severally share … duty”);25  
(4) a statement of any exceptions to liability (such as a child who was not cared for 
sufficiently by the parent while a minor);  
(5) a provision for who has standing as claimants;  
(6) a provision harmonizing the law with any relief provided by welfare programs, such 
as Medicaid;, and  
                                                     
17 VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
18 VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
19 VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
20 VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
21 VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
22 VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
23 Alaska, California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia and 
West Virginia.  See also Puerto Rico. Attached Table. 
24 Compare VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010) with 23 Pa. Cons Stat. Ann. § 4603(a) (West 2010). 
25 VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
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(7) a mechanism for enforcement.   
Some states, such as Virginia, have an eighth component, a criminal sanction or other 
penalty for failure to satisfy the identified civil duty.26  Attached to this article is a Table of all 
U.S. states (plus Puerto Rico and Washington D.C.), providing the citation to the laws of 29 
states that impose some form of filial support obligation.  Of these states, including Virginia, 
only 20 have language that appears to give an indigent or otherwise needy parent legal standing 
to bring a direct action for support against one or more children. 27 
Some states provide an express list of statutory factors to be used in deciding the amount 
of any adult child’s liability.  For example, in California, the court is required to consider the 
“circumstances of each party,” including “[e]arning capacity and needs,” “[o]bligations and 
assets,” “[a]ge and health,” “[s]tandard of living,” and “[o]ther factors the court deems just and 
equitable.”28  Other states appear to trust the “discretion” of the court, or place a cap on overall 
liability.29  Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory of the United States, provides that in addition 
to “financial capacity” of the obligated child, the court shall take into account “non-monetary 
factors, such as company, care, and services” provided by family members.30 
Several states, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Ohio, have only a criminal 
sanction for failure to support, thus providing the parent with no direct right of action against an 
adult child.31  Some states impose financial obligations on adult children in very limited 
circumstances, such as Arkansas’s law providing that children can be secondarily liable, after the 
state, for a needy parent’s mental health care,32 or Connecticut’s law limiting the child’s legal 
liability to failure to support a needy parent under the age of 65.33 In Nevada, the child’s duty to 
cover certain expenses assumed by the county is triggered only by a child’s written promise to 
support the parent.34  In Tennessee, the Welfare Department may have standing to require 
                                                     
26 VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
27 Alaska, California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia and 
West Virginia.  In addition Puerto Rico provides for a direct right of action by the parent against the child. Attached 
Table. 
28 Cal. Fam. Code §4404 (West 2004).See also  P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8 §712(f) (2009), (available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ar) (2009). 
29 Compare VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010) (sixty months) with 23 Pa. Cons Stat. Ann. § 4603(b) 
(West 2010) (providing that for “medical assistance for the aged other than public nursing home care,” the obligated 
party is liable for the lesser of actual costs or an amount to be determined under a statutory formula.). 
30P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8 §712(d) (2009), (available at http://www.lexisnexis.com) (2009). See also P.R. LAWS ANN. 
tit. 8 §736 (2009).  
31 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.050 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 20 (West 2000); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-326.1 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.21 (West 2006). 
32 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-106 (West, Westlaw through end of 2012 Fiscal Sess.). 
33 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-304 (West, Westlaw through May 8, 2012). 
34 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428.070 (2009).  
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reimbursement from responsible children, but the statute does not appear to provide a direct 
cause of action for parents against children.35  
One state, Idaho, actually repealed its filial support law recently, in 2011.36 The sponsors 
of the Idaho repeal explained that the statute was obsolete and could confuse potential applicants 
for public benefits or nursing home care.37   
 By comparison, Ukrainian law also sets forth a general obligation of the adult child to 
parents and provides courts with the power to enforce the laws.  Article 172 of the Family Code 
of Ukraine provides a “Duty of Child and Daughters and Sons Who Have Reached Majority to 
be Concerned about Parents.”38  Section 1 of Article 172 appears to be a statement of both moral 
obligation and financial responsibility, declaring that “A child and son and daughter who have 
reached majority shall be obliged to be concerned about parents, display concern for them, and 
render assistance to them.”39  Section 3 of Article 172 authorizes court enforcement of financial 
obligations, providing that “If a daughter or son who has reached majority is not concerned about 
his parents unable to work and infirm, means to cover expenses connected with rendering such 
concern may be recovered from them by decision of the court.”40 
 Ukrainian law sets forth more detailed financial obligations of sons and daughters to their 
parents at Articles 202 through 206 of the Family Code of Ukraine.41  In these sections, 
Ukrainian law permits the court to award alimony in a fixed monetary amount and/or as a share 
of earnings, taking into account the positions of the parties.42  If the parent is gravely ill or 
disabled, the court can also decree that a child with sufficient earnings or revenue must cover 
expenses for treatment and care of the parent.43  
                                                     
35 TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-114 (2004). 
36 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1002 (repealed July 2011). 
37 2011 Ida. SB 1043, available at  
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/research/default.aspx?ORIGINATION_CODE=00092&signoff=off. 
38 Family Code of Ukraine - Article 172: The Duty of a Child, Adult Daughter and Son to Care for Parents.  The 
English translation used here is from William E. Butler, FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 60 (Editorial Office of the Legal 
Journal Law of Ukraine 2011). In addition, a Ukrainian language source for Ukrainian law is available on the 
internet, at http://kodeksy.com.ua/simejnij_kodeks_ukraini/statja-172.htm (last visited May 29, 2012). Hereafter the 
citations for the Ukrainian Family Code will be to the Butler text only.   
39 Family Code of Ukraine - Article 172: The Duty of a Child, Adult Daughter and Son to Care for Parents, William 
E. Butler, FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 60 (Editorial Office of the Legal Journal Law of Ukraine 2011). 
40 Family Code of Ukraine - Article 172: The Duty of a Child, Adult Daughter and Son to Care for Parents, William 
E. Butler, FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 60 (Editorial Office of the Legal Journal Law of Ukraine 2011).   
41 Family Code of Ukraine - Articles 202-206, William E. Butler, FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 72-73 (Editorial Office 
of the Legal Journal Law of Ukraine 2011). 
42 Family Code of Ukraine - Article 202: Grounds for Duty Adult Daughter, Son, Keep Parents, William E. Butler, 
FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 72-73 (Editorial Office of the Legal Journal Law of Ukraine 2011). 
43 Family Code of Ukraine - Article 202: Grounds for Duty Adult Daughter, Son, Keep Parents, William E. Butler, 
FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 72-73 (Editorial Office of the Legal Journal Law of Ukraine 2011). 
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Ukrainian law appears to recognize two possible defenses to liability.44  Under Article 202 
(2) of the Family Code of Ukraine, the child does not have an obligation to maintain a parent 
who was deprived of parental rights by the court, and under Article 204 the child may be relieved 
of a duty to maintain parents or pay expenses “if it is established that the mother or father evaded 
the performance of their parental duties.”45   
Thus, the plain language of statutes in Virginia (and in other states in the United States)46  
and Ukraine is similar on the question of whether adult children have a legally enforceable 
obligation to provide financial support for parents who are unable to support themselves.  As will 
be discussed in Section III, the difference is in how the plain language is enforced.  
III. Comparison of Enforcement of Filial Support Laws in Requiring Adult Children 
to Support Parents 
As summarized on the attached Table, only twenty-nine of the fifty states currently have any 
form of filial support statutes that address adult children of indigent parents.  As has been 
explained by U.S. courts, there is no general common law obligation of support running from 
adult child to parent, regardless of need.47  Therefore, in the absence of a statute, a needy parent 
in the United States has no legal recourse against an adult child for financial support. 
In all but two of the twenty-nine states,48 it has become rare for the appellate courts to 
address the question of filial support, and research in twenty-seven states reveals no officially 
reported appellate decisions affirming an award of filial support against adult children during the 
last thirty or more years.49  For example, Virginia, as described above, has a long-standing filial 
support law that could be used to obligate adult children to pay support for an indigent parent.50  
Research in Lexis and Westlaw legal databanks for both officially and unofficially published 
decisions decided under the Virginia statute discloses episodic enforcement over the full history 
of the statute.51  During the last fifty years, however, there is only one lower court decision 
imposing financial liability on an adult child.  In Peyton v. Peyton, a Virginia trial court case 
from 1978, an adult son sued his adult brother, seeking contribution towards the cost of nursing 
                                                     
44 Family Code of Ukraine - Article 202: Grounds for Duty Adult Daughter, Son, Keep Parents, William E. Butler, 
FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 72-73 (Editorial Office of the Legal Journal Law of Ukraine 2011). 
45 Family Code of Ukraine - Article 202: Grounds for Duty Adult Daughter, Son, Keep Parents, William E. Butler, 
FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 72-73 (Editorial Office of the Legal Journal Law of Ukraine 2011). 
46 See footnote ___(currently 23), supra, and the attached Table.  
47 E.g., Sharpe v. Sharpe, 163 A.2d 923, 924-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) (concurring opinion); Dawson v. Dawson, 12 
Iowa 512 (Iowa, 1861) (distinguishing the “perfect” common law duty of parent to support minor children, from the 
need for a statute in order to impose a legal duty on adult child to support parent, regardless of whatever obligation 
may exist “by the law of nature”; also refusing to permit third parties to invoke statutory duty of adult child to 
support parent as grounds for payment of parent’s accrued debt). 
48 The exception states are Pennsylvania and South Dakota, as discussed in Section V, infra. 
49 See attached Table. 
50 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
51 E.g., Mitchell-Powers Hardware Co. v. Eaton, 198 S.E. 496 (Va. 1938) (recognizing that prior to 1927 there was 
no legal obligation running from child to parent, and that this was changed by the adoption of the Virginia statute, 
thus requiring remand for further proceedings). 
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home care for their incapacitated mother.52  The reluctant brother was making voluntary 
payments of $150 (USD) per month in support for his mother, but the court determined that 
based on the respective incomes of the parties, the defendant son would also be responsible to 
reimburse his brother for an additional $8,000 (USD) for costs of past care.53    
In the United States, it can be difficult to research whether contemporary courts are being 
asked to enforce filial support laws.  First, the courts of primary jurisdiction (state trial courts), 
do not routinely publish their opinions in official reporters.54    Second, unlike child support, 
filial support laws do not have a single, identifiable label to assist researchers when using 
unofficial reporting tools.55  Thus, it is possible that filial suits are filed in state trial courts, but 
are difficult to identify because the cases are resolved, settled, and never appealed.   Nonetheless, 
it seems unlikely that there are significant numbers of such cases because of the absence of 
reported appellate case decisions citing to the filial support laws.  Further, the author’s search for 
“parental support,” “filial support,” “family responsibility,” or “family support” reveals hundreds 
of cases in both official and unofficial reporters, but the cases usually involve a parent’s 
obligation to pay child support for a minor dependent or a spouse’s obligation to pay spousal 
support.56  The relatively few appellate cases that discuss application of specific state filial 
support laws are captured on the attached Table and suggest that in most U.S. states during the 
last thirty to fifty years, the surviving laws have rarely been used to establish filial support 
orders. 
By comparison, in Ukraine, research conducted on the electronic data bank at 
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua, which covers cases decided during or after 2004, reveals 113 cases 
                                                     
52 Peyton v. Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. 531, 531 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1978) (also available at 1978 Va. Cir. LEXIS 19). 
53 Peyton v. Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. 531, 531 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1978). Research also reveals one “recent” case enforcing filial 
support laws in Puerto Rico.  In Chavez v. Hernandez et al., Civil Núm. KAL 2005–1188, 2008 WL 5561018 
(TCA), (P.R. Cir. 2008) (in Spanish, using a translation, with assistance from Google Translate and Research 
Assistant Matthew McDonald), four family members were ordered to contribute to the support of their mother by 
paying a total of $1,846.32 monthly, with each paying $461.58.  The equal amounts were confirmed on appeal 
despite evidence the mother had a long interval of no contact with one daughter, “abandonment” that was later 
“reconciled.” The appellate court also ordered the children responsible for a total of $19,026.80 in retroactive 
payments. Id.  
54 As noted by legal researchers willing to tackle the daunting challenge of creating statistical records by mining 
unpublished trial court opinions, it is possible that perceptions about the American legal system become distorted 
because legal analysts so often depend on published, appellate opinions, which may be comparatively few in number 
and tied to narrow issues. See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, “Plaintiphobia in State Court? An Empirical 
Study of State Court Trials on Appeal,” 38 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 121 (2009).  See also J. Thomas Sullivan, 
“Unpublished Opinions and No Citation Rules in the Trial Courts,” 47 Arizona Law Review 419, 421 (2005) 
(arguing that unpublished decisions by appellate court, even though unofficial in terms of precedent, could provide 
important guidance to trial judges and trial attorneys); The Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, 130 (1990) (discussing the practical reasons for unpublished opinions at the appellate 
level). 
55 For example, Virginia’s filial support statute, Va. Code Ann. 20-88, has the title “Support of parents by children.” 
A search using terms such as “parent and child and support” will result in thousands of cases on Westlaw or Lexis 
for Virginia cases using those terms results in more than a thousand cases, because of the overlapping use of these 
terms for cases involving minor child support.  
56 Id. 
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citing Section 172, Family Code of Ukraine.57  The Ukrainian cases demonstrate that when the 
statute is invoked, the courts will impose liability on the adult child to care for or financially 
support a parent in need.  Examples of cases decided recently under Section 172 include: 
 The 2011 decision by the court in the Khortytskyi District in the Zaporizhzhya 
region (Case Number 2-2382/2011, decided 11/16/2011), where a son, 
employed as a foreman in a factory, was found liable to pay one quarter of his 
monthly income to support his mother, who was seriously ill with heart 
disease and kidney disease, for as long as his mother was in need of medical 
supplies, food and other material assistance.58  
 
 The 2011 decision by the court in the Kirov District in the Dnipropetrovsk 
region (Case Number 2-824/2011r, decided 5/20/2011), where an adult son 
was held liable to pay 1000 hrivna (Ukrainian currency) monthly to his elderly 
disabled father, which was roughly equivalent to $125 (USD) per month.  The 
court noted that the father, a World War II veteran with high expenses for 
medicine, had made repeated requests for assistance to his son, a director at a 
regional music and drama theater.  The son, who was married with no minor 
children, reportedly refused. The lump sum awarded by the court appeared to 
be slightly less than one-quarter of the son’s monthly income of 4,447 
hrivna.59  
 
 The 2010 decision by the court in the Sniguivska District of the Mykolayiv 
region, (Case Number 2-295/2010, decided 4/14/2010), where the son (who 
was also paying child support for a minor child) was held liable to pay one-
third of his income to assist his father and mother, who were disabled and 
living on a combined pension at a subsistence minimum level equivalent to 
approximately $200 (USD) per month.60  
 
 The 2009 decision by the court in the Novmomoskovsk District of the 
Dnipropretrovsk region (Case Number 2-1863/09, decided 3/18/2009), where 
the son was ordered to contribute one-quarter of his monthly income to 
supplement his divorced mother’s monthly pension, because she was retired, 
                                                     
57 Single State Register of Judgments in Ukraine at  http://reyestr.court.gov.ua (last visited May 27, 2012). 
58 Single State Register of Judgments - Case # 2-2382 http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/19487697 
(last visited May 27, 2012). 
59 Single State Register of Judgments - Case # 2-824p http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/16234296 
(last visited June 7, 2012). 
60 Single State Register of Judgments- Case # 2-295 http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/8893598  
(last visited May 27, 2012). 
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living alone, lacked funds for medicine and utilities, and was unable to stand 
on her feet in lines.61  
 
  The 2009 decision by the court in the Dicanskogo District of the Poltava 
region (Case Number 2-322/09, decided 10/8/2009), where the court ordered a 
son to pay a lump sum in Ukrainian currency,  roughly equivalent to $10 
dollars (USD) per month, to assist his elderly father with the purchase of food 
and medicine.62    
By U.S. standards, the percentages of income (one-quarter to one-third of the adult child’s 
income) awarded in three of the five cases appear to be surprisingly large shares.63  In these 
cases, the courts do not report the adult child’s total monthly salary, only the percentage 
awarded.  The monetary value of the percentages, however, when converted to U.S. currency 
equivalents, appear to be modest in size and similar to the lump sum amounts awarded in the 
other two Ukraine cases.64  For example, to analyze the first case reported above, the court 
ordered the child to pay one quarter of his monthly income to his parent.65  According to 
government statistics, the average 2011 salary for the region in question, the Zaporizhzhya 
region of Ukraine, is 2607 hrivna per month.66 One quarter of that average monthly income (650 
hrivna) would be the equivalent of approximately $81 USD, using the applicable exchange rate 
of $1 USD = 8 hrivna.67  This calculation, of course, does not take into account taxes or the 
potential for unreported income in Ukraine.  Nonetheless, the comparatively high percentages of 
incomes involved in Ukrainian filial awards demonstrate the potential hardship on the adult child 
from an award of support.  At the same time, the cases demonstrate the impact of poverty – and 
the importance of even a few “dollars” extra per month – for the elder parent.   
In addition to direct support awards, the Ukrainian Family Code also supports denial of 
inheritance rights where the adult child is shown to have failed to provide the parent with 
                                                     
61 Single State Register of Judgments - Case # 2-1863 http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/10793926  
(last visited May 27, 2012). 
62 Single State Register of Judgments - Case # 2-322 http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/5428486  
(last visited May 27, 2012). 
63 Single State Register of Judgments - Case # 2-2382 http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/19487697  
(last visited May 27, 2012); Single State Register of Judgments- Case # 2-295 
http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/8893598 (last visited May 27, 2012); Single State Register of Judgments- Case # 
2-1863, http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/10793926 (last visited May 27, 2012). 
64 Single State Register of Judgments - Case # 2-322, http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/5428486 (last visited May 
27, 2012). 
65 Single State Register of Judgments - Case # 2-295, http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/19487697  
(last visited May 27, 2012). 
66 State Statistics Services of Ukraine, http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua (last visited May 27, 2012) 
67 Single State Register of Judgments - Case # 2-295  http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/19487697 
(last visited May 27, 2012). 
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adequate financial support and consideration.68  The following case summaries from recent trials 
in the Ukraine provide examples: 
 The 2010 decision by the court in the Dniprovskyi District in Kiev (Case 
Number 2-1905/09, decided 4/15/2010), where a statutory inheritance was 
denied to one daughter, permitting the mother’s entire estate (including an 
apartment and money in a savings account) to go to another daughter who 
had provided care, in accordance with terms in the mother’s will.  The 
evidence showed the mother was disabled with a heart condition and died 
at the age of 89.  The denial of inheritance was ordered even though the 
daughter testified that she lived some distance away, did visit her mother, 
had a good relationship with her mother, and that offers of help were 
refused, possibly because of the influence of the local daughter. The court 
noted that sons and daughters must take care of parents in order to satisfy 
Article 172’s obligation to show concern and offer assistance.69 
 
 The 2009 decision by the court in the Perchersk District in Kiev (Case 
Number 2-3842/09, decided 12/24/2009), where a neighbor and his wife 
who provided care to a 90 year old man before his death were permitted to 
inherit fully under the man’s will.  The court rejected the statutory 
inheritance claim of the son, citing the son’s failed duties under Article 
172.  The court observed that the evidence established that the father had 
suffered a stroke and was confined to his apartment. The son’s phone calls 
to his father were not adequate to show he gave his father necessary 
consideration, and the court rejected evidence that the son’s failure to visit 
could be explained by being unaware of the father’s worsening health, or 
by the fact the son had a sick wife and was living in another city.70      
The author’s examination of Ukrainian cases has been limited and constrained by lack of 
personal familiarity with the context and language; the author has relied on translations.  
Therefore, the author is cautious in offering observations.  At the same time, however, interesting 
questions are raised by the modern research demonstrating comparatively greater use of the filial 
support law in Ukraine than in U.S. states.  In part, the difference may be explained by the 
historical role of Medicaid in the United States in paying for health care for the poor as well as 
being the primary payer for long-term cares costs in nursing homes, as discussed in the next 
section.   
                                                     
68 Family Code of Ukraine - Article 172: The Duty of a Child, Adult Daughter and Son to Care for Parents, William 
E. Butler, FAMILY CODE OF UKRAINE 60 (Editorial Office of the Legal Journal Law of Ukraine 2011). 
69 Single State Register of Judgments- Case # 2-1905 http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/9511622 
(last visited May 27, 2012). 
70 Single State Register of Judgments- Case # 2-3842 http://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/7261574 
(last visited May 27, 2012). 
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IV. The Impact of Public Benefit Systems for Older Adults in the U.S. 
 Adult children in the United States frequently provide direct care for their aging parents, 
or, alternatively finance in whole or in part the care that is provided by third parties.  A 2011 
study by AARP, the largest American advocacy organization for older adults, reports that “[t]wo 
out of three (66 percent) older people with disabilities who receive [long-term services and 
supports] at home get all their care exclusively from their family caregivers, mostly wives and 
adult daughters.”71 In addition, another twenty-six percent receive “some combination of family 
care and paid help; only 9 percent received paid help [in the home] alone.”72 The same study 
concluded that the “‘average’ U.S. caregiver is a 49-year-old woman who works outside the 
home and spends nearly 20 hours per week providing unpaid care to her mother for nearly five 
years.73 An estimate value for uncompensated care provided by family members to elders in the 
U.S. was $450 billion (USD) in 2009, up from $375 billion (USD) in 2007.74   In the absence of 
significant evidence of state court cases seeking compelled parental support orders, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that such care provided by adult children is voluntary, resulting from 
feelings of personal devotion or moral duty.      
Research suggests that filial support laws have long been, at best, a minor tool in 
providing practical, financial assistance to older adults.  Looking to England, in 1909, a Poor 
Law Commission evaluated the impact of England’s long-standing filial support laws.75 The 
majority in the Commission deplored what they described, more than a century ago, as the 
“weakness of a sense of filial responsibility in the present generation.”76  In the commission 
report, while there were differences of opinion about solutions to the problem of poverty among 
the “aged and infirm,” it was apparent that filial support laws were largely viewed as more 
symbolic than practical, and the report cited instances of uneven application leading to harsh 
results in individual cases.77 England repealed its filial support provisions in 1948.78  
                                                     
71 Lynn Feinberg et al, Valuing the Invaluable: 2011 Update on the Growing Contributions and Costs of Family 
Caregiving 8 (AARP Public Policy Institute, 2011) available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/i51-
caregiving.pdf. 
72 Lynn Feinberg et al, Valuing the Invaluable: 2011 Update on the Growing Contributions and Costs of Family 
Caregiving 8 (AARP Public Policy Institute, 2011) available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/i51-
caregiving.pdf. 
73 Lynn Feinberg et al, Valuing the Invaluable: 2011 Update on the Growing Contributions and Costs of Family 
Caregiving 1 (AARP Public Policy Institute, 2011) available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/i51-
caregiving.pdf. 
74 Lynn Feinberg et al, Valuing the Invaluable: 2011 Update on the Growing Contributions and Costs of Family 
Caregiving 1 (AARP Public Policy Institute, 2011) available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/i51-
caregiving.pdf. 
75 Poor Law Commission, New Poor Law or No Poor Law, Being a Description of the Majority and Minority 
Reports of the Poor Law Commission 102-111 (J.M Dent & Co) (1909), available at 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104276599. 
76 Id. at 107.  
77 Poor Law Commission, New Poor Law or No Poor Law, Being a Description of the Majority and Minority 
Reports of the Poor Law Commission 102-111 (J.M Dent & Co) (1909), available at 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104276599. 
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In the United States, filial support laws became less significant after the implementation 
of a national system of Social Security (1935), providing payments to any adult who had earned 
sufficient quarters of credit during his or her working years.79  In 1964 the U.S. enacted a 
national system of health insurance for older adults, Medicare, and a combined federal/state 
system of health-related benefits including long-term care for impoverished, disabled elders, 
known nationally as Medicaid.80  With the rise in availability and dependence on Medicare and 
Medicaid, the likelihood was lowered that courts would be called upon to determine filial 
support orders.81   The general U.S. prosperity of the latter half of the Twentieth Century, 
including a long period when workers were able to qualify for defined benefit retirement 
programs, also undoubtedly served to ease financing concerns for many families.82   
Public benefits under state and federal old-age programs could be viewed as the more 
important safety net for indigent older adults.  However, case law in the United States often 
demonstrates a tension in attitudes towards the public’s willingness to fund public benefit 
programs rather than insist on private responsibilities of families.  For example, one trial judge 
felt compelled to enforce a long-standing filial support law against an adult son, despite evidence 
the father “was not worthy of any help,” commenting “[b]oth this kind of case and this type of 
defense now appear frequently before this court by reason of the attempt of the relief authorities 
to compel children to support their parents before they become a public charge.”83  The judge 
nonetheless awarded only “$1 per week” for the father’s support, which even in 1940 must have 
been of minimal practical benefit.84  At various times, questions have been raised about whether 
states should seek reimbursement from adult children for public benefits paid to their parents.   
The history of California’s filial support laws demonstrates the tension over whether 
support of older adults should primarily be a public or private obligation, and whether any 
private obligation should include other family members. California’s filial support laws date 
back to 1872, with the surviving obligation now set forth in the California Family Code at § 
4400.85  In County of San Mateo v. Boss, decided in 1971, the Supreme Court of California relied 
                                                                                                                                                                           
78 National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 29, preamble (Eng.) (repealing filial support and other 
provisions) (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/11-12/29/introduction). 
79 Corning, Peter A., Report: The Evolution of Medicare, from Idea to Law Chapter 2 (Social Security 
Administration’s Office of Research and Statistics, 1969) available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/corningchap2.html. 
80 Corning, Peter A., Report: The Evolution of Medicare, from Idea to Law Chapter 4 (Social Security 
Administration’s Office of Research and Statistics, 1969) available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/corningchap4.html. 
81 Corning, Peter A., Report: The Evolution of Medicare, from Idea to Law Chapter 5 (Social Security 
Administration’s Office of Research and Statistics, 1969) available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/corningchap5.html. 
82 See generally, Gordon L. Clark, Alicia H. Munnell, & J. Michael Orszag, “Pension and Retirement Income in a 
Global Environment,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME  10-27 (eds. Gordon. L. 
Clark, Alicia H. Munnell, J. Michael Orszag, 2006).  
83 Commonwealth v. Auman, 39  Pa. D & C 448, 1941 WL 2705 (Pa. Municipal Court, 1940).  
84 Id.  
85 Cal. Fam. Code § 4400 (West 2004). 
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on a constitutional theory of equal protection.86  The court held that where a sixty-six year old 
woman, living in her own home, was unable to work and was receiving public “old age” benefits 
each month, her son was not obligated to reimburse the state, despite working and earning 
adequate wages as a mechanic to contribute $20 per month for her support, and with no other 
dependents.87  The court concluded that it was “clear a person can qualify to receive aid to the 
aged and yet not be so destitute that his children will owe him a duty of support” under the 
California statute.88    
Following the 1971 California Supreme Court decision, the California legislature 
amended its filial support statute to provide more clearly that all adult children of persons 
receiving aid to the aged would have a duty of support for their parent, thereby obligating adult 
children to reimburse the state for public benefits paid to their parent.89  The revision provided a 
reciprocal duty to support “needy” parents or children, instead of only those deemed “poor.”90  
The California Supreme Court then concluded, in Swoap v. Superior Court of Sacramento 
County decided in 1973, that the revised statute provided a rational, enforceable basis for 
California to require adult children to reimburse the state for aid granted to their parents.91  In so 
ruling, the court reversed its own decision in Boss, noting that it was “not unmindful that these 
provisions may involve harsh results in certain instances and we are indeed sympathetic with the 
plight of such persons,” but the “amelioration of any harsh results” was left to the state’s 
administrative authorities.92 
In light of the above history and the fact that the filial support law, Section 4400, remains 
on California’s law books, one would expect that research in California would reveal cases 
where either parents or the state were seeking to enforce California’s filial support rules against 
adult children.  However, in 1975, the California legislature acted again, amending its welfare 
code at Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code § 12350 to provide that notwithstanding filial support or other 
family-member support provisions in California law, relatives could not be held liable to support 
the needy parent or reimburse the state if the parent or other family member was applying for or 
receiving welfare aid.93  The effect of this history was to undercut the role of filial support laws.  
There was no need for the needy parent to sue an unwilling child for support because that same 
needy parent would probably qualify for public funding.  If the parent qualified for public 
funding, the state was barred from seeking reimbursement from the child.94  Thus, California’s 
filial support law continues to be on the books, but currently has limited practical utility at least 
                                                     
86 County of San Mateo v. Boss, 479 P.2d 654, 659 (Cal. 1971). 
87 County of San Mateo v. Boss, 479 P.2d 654, 659 (Cal. 1971). 
88 County of San Mateo v. Boss, 479 P.2d 654, 659 (Cal. 1971). 
89 Cal. Fam. Code § 4400 (West 2004). 
90 Cal. Fam. Code § 4400 (West 2004). 
91 Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 852 (Cal. 1973). 
92 Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 852 (Cal. 1973). 
93 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §12350 (West 2001). 
94 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §12350 (West 2001). 
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in situations where the elder is eligible to receive public aid.95 Research reveals no appellate 
cases addressing enforcement of California’s filial support law since 1975. 
Medicaid, the joint state-federal program “designed to pay for the medical expenses of 
low income individuals who are aged, blind or disabled”96 was added as a component of the 
overall Social Security structure.   In the mid-1960s, it became the statutory policy of the federal 
government that states cannot consider an adult child’s resources in determining the “eligibility” 
of the parent for Medicaid.97   Further, for a period of time, federal administrative policy directed 
that states could not require the children of aged Medicaid recipients to “reimburse” either the 
federal or state governments for the costs of those services.98 Many states, including California 
as described above, repealed or limited their filial support laws because of the federal policies, 
and even when the federal restriction reportedly changed in 1983 to permit reimbursement 
claims,99 there has been little appetite in most states’ welfare agencies to tie Medicaid to filial 
support from reluctant children.100  Virginia’s filial support law expressly permits the state to 
seek Medicaid reimbursement from adult children to the extent permitted by federal law, but 
there are no modern cases suggesting that reimbursement has been pursued by state 
authorities.101  
Significantly, Medicaid “foots the bill for almost half of the paid long-term care provided 
in the United States.”102 However, arguments over how to control or cut such public expenditures 
are growing louder in the United States.  For example, in 2006, Congress enacted a Deficit 
Reduction Act, Public Law No. 109-171, with increased penalties on individuals who transfer 
assets for less than fair market value before applying for Medicaid, as well as other limitations 
                                                     
95 George F. Indest, Legal Aspects of HCFA’s Decision to Allow Recovery from Children for Medicaid Benefits 
Delivered to their Parents through State Financial Responsibility Statutes: A Case of Bad Rule Making Through 
Failure to Comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 225, 236 (Fall, 
1998). 
96 Lawrence A. Frolik & Richard Kaplan, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 110 (5th Ed. 2010).  
9742 U.S.C. § 1396A(a)(17(D) and 42 C.F.R. § 435.602(a)(1). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3 and 1396r(c) 
(prohibiting Medicare/Medicaid certified nursing homes from requiring third-party guarantees of payment as 
condition of admission).  
98 George F. Indest, Legal Aspects of HCFA’s Decision to Allow Recovery from Children for Medicaid Benefits 
Delivered to their Parents through State Financial Responsibility Statutes: A Case of Bad Rule Making Through 
Failure to Comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 225, 226-27 
(Fall, 1998) 
99See discussion of reasons for New York’s 1966 elimination of “filial obligation to indigent parents” in order to 
participate in  “the Federal Medicare program,” in State Welfare Commission v. Mintz, 280 N.Y.S. 2d 1007, 1009-10 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1967). See also George F. Indest, Legal Aspects of HCFA’s Decision to Allow Recovery from 
Children for Medicaid Benefits Delivered to their Parents through State Financial Responsibility Statutes: A Case of 
Bad Rule Making Through Failure to Comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 225, 302 (Fall, 1998) 
100 See e.g. Pennsylvania law, providing that while determination of an adult’s eligibility for Medicaid (Medical 
Assistance) can take into account, as appropriate, the resources of a spouse, “financial responsibility” of other family 
members cannot be considered.  62 P.S. §447(a).  
101 Renae Reed Patrick, Honor Thy Father and Mother: Paying the Medical Bills of Elderly Parents, 19 UNIVERSITY 
OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW 69, 82-83 (1984) (referencing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (2008 & Supp. 2010)). 
102 Marshall B. Kapp, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ELDER CARE 221 (Jones & Barlett Publishers, 2010). 
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on eligibility for long-term care benefits.103  With the financial crisis that began in 2008, the 
pressure on the states to cut public funding for old-age care is ever increasing.  With the pressure 
to cut public funding in the U.S., filial support laws have generated renewed interest on at least a 
theoretical or academic level.104      
V. Enforcement of Pennsylvania’s Filial Support Law and Claims by Third-Parties 
for Care Costs 
 As documented on the Table and discussed above, research suggests that during the last 
fifty years the surviving filial support statutes have been used infrequently in most U.S. states 
against adult children.  In one state, Pennsylvania, the modern trend has been quite different.105    
The key language in Pennsylvania’s family support statute provides that “all of the following 
individuals have the responsibility to care for and maintain or financially assist an indigent 
person, regardless of whether the indigent person is a public charge: (i) the spouse of the indigent 
person. (ii) A child of the indigent person. (iii) A parent of the indigent person.”106  Spousal and 
parental obligations in this section overlap obligations contained elsewhere in the Pennsylvania 
domestic relations code that cover obligations to provide spousal support and parental support of 
children.107   Therefore, as with the more narrowly focused statute in Virginia discussed above, 
the key language of the Pennsylvania law is the filial support language, obligating the child of 
the indigent person.108   Pennsylvania’s statute expressly permits suit to be filed by “the indigent 
                                                     
103 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4. 
104 Lynda Yamamoto, Overcrowded Prisons and Filial Responsibility: Will States Utilize "Support of the Indigent" 
Statutes to Solve the Baby Boomer and Prison Crises? 41 RUTGERS L. J. 435 (2009) (reaching a unique conclusion, 
that enforcement of filial support laws is necessary to prevent the overcrowding of prisons with geriatric. 
impoverished prisoners); Andrea Rickles-Jordan, Filial Responsibility: A Survey Across Time and Oceans 9 MARQ. 
ELDER'S ADVISOR 183 (2007) (urging enforcement of filial support laws to help impoverished seniors, while citing 
support for the concept in the tradition of Judaism, Christianity, Muslims, Roman Law and English law); Matthew 
Pakula, A Federal Filial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform Tool to Help Combat the Wave of Indigent Elderly, 39 
FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 859, 876-77 (Fall 2005) (urging a consistent, national policy).   
105 Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support Obligations in Pennsylvania: Adult Children, Parents, and Spouses, 
Chapter 14a in  ELDER LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA (Jeffrey A. Marshall ed., PBI Press, 3d ed. 2011);  Katherine C. 
Pearson, Rethinking Filial Support Laws in a Time of Medicaid Cutbacks, 76 PENNSYLVANIA BAR QUARTERLY 162, 
165-70 (2005).  
106 23 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. § 4603 (West 2010). 
107 23 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. § 4321 (West 2010). 
108 23 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. § 4603 (West 2010). The plain language of Pennsylvania’s statute makes the care and 
financial assistance obligation reciprocal, running to “indigent” parents or “indigent” children, without limitation on 
age. See e.g., Verna v. Verna 432 A.2d 630 (Pa. Super. 1981) (holding father liable to pay medical expenses for his 
adult daughter under 62 P.S. §1973, the predecessor statute to  Section 4603 in the domestic relations code).    
One line of cases in Pennsylvania holds that parents are not obligated to support their children after emancipation if 
the child was not disabled as date of emancipation.  See e.g., Style v. Shaub, 955 A.2d 403 (Pa. Super. 20008) 
(holding that where child’s psychiatric and medical disabilities existed before he reached the age of majority, the 
parent’s support obligation continues, and describing emancipation as creating a presumption of non-entitlement to 
support that can be rebutted only if there is evidence of disability before reaching the age of majority).  In recent 
years, such rulings have ignored the reciprocal parent/child language of Section 4603.  See Shaffer-Doan v. 
Department of Public Welfare, 960 A.2d 500, 513 n. 25 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting the apparent inconsistency 
between the ruling in Style and Section 4603’s filial responsibility obligation).      
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person” or by “any other person or public body or public agency having any interest in the care, 
maintenance or assistance of such indigent person.”109   
Despite structural changes, Pennsylvania’s filial support language setting forth the obligation 
of the child (interpreted practically, as the “adult” child) remained largely intact since first 
enacted.110 Between 1937 and 2005, Pennsylvania’s filial support provisions were part of its 
public welfare laws.111 For a period of time, the viability of the filial support language was 
masked by the use of “repealed” in an explanatory paragraph attached to the statute in 1976.112  
In 2005, the statute was modified slightly by the state legislature and moved to the domestic 
relations code.113   
The modern era for filial support enforcement in Pennsylvania arguably began in 1994 with 
the case of Savoy v. Savoy, where an adult son was sued by his divorced mother.114  The mother 
had a series of health problems, including surgery on her neck and a fall that resulted in a broken 
ankle.115  She had received a lump sum worker’s compensation benefit and she had monthly 
income of $438 (USD) in the form of social security benefits.116  However, she also had unpaid 
medical expenses in excess of $10,000 (USD).117  Her son was a part-owner and manager of a 
family-owned furniture manufacturing business and had no dependents.118  According to 
evidence presented at trial, the son had $2,327 (USD) in monthly income but also reported 
monthly expenses of $2,583 (USD).119  He implicitly argued that under the language of 
Pennsylvania’s law he could not be liable to financially assist his mother because he did not have 
“sufficient financial ability.”120  The court rejected this argument and concluded that even though 
                                                     
109 23 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. § 4603(c) (West 2010). 
110 See e.g., 1937 Pa. Laws 2045 (partially repealed 1985, fully repealed 2005), when the substantive law was moved 
from the welfare laws to the Domestic Relations Code, at 23 Pa. Cons Stat. Ann. § 4603 (West. 2010). 
111 62 P.S. §§ 1971-1976 can be traced further to the Colonial Laws of Pennsylvania 1705-6, ch. CLIV, § II, at 251-
53. 
112 See discussion in Savoy v. Savoy, 641 S.2d 596, 597-98 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
113 The transfer of the statute, accomplished by repealing the original text at 62 P.S. §§ 1971-1976, and enacting 23 
Pa. Con Stat. Ann. §§ 4601-4606, was described as being part of a long-range effort to “codify” old laws that existed 
in an unofficial compilation, known as Laws of Pennsylvania.  However, the timing of the legislative action proved 
to be controversial, as discussed by the author elsewhere. See Katherine C. Pearson, Rethinking Filial Support Laws 
in a Time of Medicaid Cutbacks, 76 PENNSYLVANIA BAR QUARTERLY 162, 165-70 (2005).  See also, Katherine C. 
Pearson, Filial Support Obligations in Pennsylvania: Adult Children, Parents, and Spouses, Chapter 14a in   ELDER 
LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA (Jeffrey A. Marshall ed., PBI Press, 3d ed. 2011). 
114 23 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. § 4603(c) (West 2010). 
115 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994).  Other potentially important decisions involving adult 
children and parents were issued by the Superior Court in 1955, 1968 and 1981, but the precedential value of those 
rulings for adult children’s liability for support of a parent was unclear in light of the “repealed” label applied to the 
statute in 1976.  See Commonwealth ex rel. Home for the Jewish Aged v. Kotzker, 118 A.2d 271 (Pa. super. 1955) 
(holding adult child liable); Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Forman, 243 A.2d 181 (Pa. Super. 1968) (holding adult 
child liable); and Verna v. Verna, 432 A.2d 630 (Pa. Super. 1981) (holding parent liable to adult child for support). 
116 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
117 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
118 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
119 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
120 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
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the mother had some monthly income, she was “indigent” for purposes of the filial support 
statute because her “reasonable living expenses” exceeded her monthly income.121  The appellate 
court affirmed the trial court’s order that the son must pay $125 (USD) per month towards his 
mother’s past medical care expenses.122  The court rejected the son’s final argument that the 
statute in question had been repealed through two decades of changes in the overall welfare 
law.123  
   The 1994 Savoy case can be seen as a turning point for two reasons.  First, it was a modern 
era case permitting the parent to sue the adult child directly for support and concluding that 
liability could not be avoided by a superficial demonstration that the child’s expenses exceeded 
his income.124  Second, even though the parent sued the child, seeking a “parental support order,” 
the court ordered the son to pay the mother’s past health care providers, not the mother.125  The 
mother was the plaintiff; the hospital was to be the actual recipient of the award.126   
 The next case was Presbyterian Medical Center v. Budd decided in 2003.127  In this case 
a nursing home sued the daughter of a resident on several theories, including the filial support 
law, breach of contract, fraud, and equitable theories such as restitution.128  The nursing home 
alleged that at the time of the mother’s death there was an outstanding balance of $96,000 
(USD).129  The nursing home claimed that the daughter had promised to apply for Medicaid to 
pay for the long-term care for her mother, but instead she used a power of attorney to transfer 
more than $100,000 (USD) from her mother’s bank accounts to herself.130  The Court of Appeals 
was asked to decide whether any of the theories alleged by the nursing home could be used to 
recover the unpaid care costs from the daughter.131  The court found that technical reasons 
defeated all but one of the nursing home’s claims.132  On the filial support claim, the appellate 
                                                     
121 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 599-600 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
122 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
123 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
124 Pennsylvania’s law is reciprocal, permitting either the child or the parent, if indigent, to seek support. 23 PA. 
CONS STAT. ANN. § 4603 (West 2010).  In deciding the adult son’s liability for his mother’s medical expenses in 
Savoy, the Superior Court viewed its holding in Verna v. Verna, 432 A.2d 630 (Pa. Super. 1981), holding a father 
obligated to contribute $50 per month towards his emancipated daughter’s uninsured medical expenses, as 
precedent. Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994). In the thirteen year interval between the two cases, 
there were changes in the Public Welfare Code that raised a question as to whether the filial support language had 
been repealed or limited; however, these arguments were rejected by the Superior Court in the Savoy decision. Id. 
125 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
126 The outcome arguably was unsatisfactory to all concerned in Savoy v. Savoy. If the mother’s primary financial 
concern was the back debt, her most direct relief might have been bankruptcy; obligating the reluctant son to make 
the payment on the back debt for many months into the future most likely ensured that he would not reunite and care 
for his mother; the hospital would probably have preferred to make its own arrangements for payment of the back 
debt.    
127 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
128 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
129 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
130 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
131 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
132 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
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court ruled that the nursing home could use the filial support law as a means of recovering its 
costs of caring for the “indigent” mother from the daughter.133    
The 2003 Budd case was important because it confirmed that a company could make a direct 
claim against an adult child for filial support as a “person . . . having interest in the care, 
maintenance or assistance” of the parent.134  The case was also important because the court 
commented on the fault of the daughter in making her mother indigent.135  However, by 
permitting the case to go forward on the filial support law, the court was authorizing a potential 
recovery without requiring the claimant to prove fraud, breach of contract, or other fault as the 
basis of the child’s liability.136   
In 2005, two years after the decision in Budd, the Pennsylvania legislature moved the filial 
support law from the public welfare code to the domestic relations code, a move that further 
raised the visibility of the law.137 The Governor described the action as “[updating] provisions 
requiring that immediate family members contribute to the cost of care, thus decreasing the 
burden on the Medical Assistance program, when possible.”138 Nursing homes and other long-
term care facilities began using the law to sue relatives of residents with greater frequency.   The 
author’s 2008 search on Westlaw, Lexis, and in three county courthouse electronic databases 
identified fifteen pending lawsuits filed by third-parties such as nursing homes against adult 
children or spouses for costs of care provided to older adults, citing Pennsylvania’s filial support 
law as one of the alternative grounds for liability.139    
                                                     
133 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
134 23 PA. CONS STAT. ANN. § 4603 (West 2010). 
135 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
136 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1077 (Pa. Super. 2003). In the Budd case, the daughter was 
alleged to have had direct contact with her mother’s nursing home, falsely assuring the facility she was making an 
application for Medicaid on her mother’s behalf. Id. at 110. Past cases permitting the use of filial support claims 
against an adult child by third-party claimants had relied on the doctrine of assumpsit, an implied contract theory, to 
permit retroactive recovery for pre-suit support. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Forman, 243 A.2d 181, 183-184 (Pa. 
Super. 1968). See also Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support Obligations in Pennsylvania: Adult Children, Parents, 
and Spouses, in ELDER LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA 974-977(Jeffrey A. Marshall ed., PBI Press, 3d ed. 2011) (urging 
caution in understanding the rulings of Budd and similar cases to permit “retroactive” awards, especially in the 
absence of “fault” or misleading conduct on the part of the adult child in dealing with the parent’s nursing home). 
137 Katherine C. Pearson, Rethinking Filial Support Laws in a Time of Medicaid Cutbacks, 76 PENNSYLVANIA BAR 
QUARTERLY 162, 165 (2005) (tracing history).  
138 Governor’s Message, July 31, 2005, PA. Gov. Mess., 7/31/2005 (available on Westlaw in the Legislative History 
for 23 Pa. Con Stat. Ann. § 4601). Despite the likely political popularity of this announcement, however, federal law 
prohibits states from taking “into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or recipient 
of assistance under the [state Medicaid] plan unless such applicant or recipient is such individual’s spouse or such 
individual’s child who is under age 21” when determining eligibility for Medicaid (also known as Medical 
Assistance in Pennsylvania). See 42 U.S.C. §1396A(a)(17)(D).  See also 42 C.F.R. § 435.602(a)(1)(2003) and 62 
P.S. § 447(a), a Pennsylvania administrative code provision providing that “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no  repayment shall be required of any medical assistance paid in behalf of any person who which he was 
eligible; and, with respect to the determination of eligibility for such assistance, no relative . . . shall be required to 
contribute to the cost of the care for which such assistance is provided.” 
139 Katherine C. Pearson & Trisha A. Cowart, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION 152-54 nn. 21-23 
(Bisel Co., 2011). 
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The post-2005 spotlight on the law led to members of the Pennsylvania Bar Association to 
unite in opposition to the emerging pattern of enforcement practices, with the Bar Association 
calling for repeal of Pennsylvania’s filial support language.140  A bill was introduced by 
legislators in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives for the 2011-2012 Legislative Session 
and is still pending as of June 2012; if passed without changes the bill would repeal the filial 
support provision.141  
The Pennsylvania cases filed against children also began attracting media attention about the 
use of the filial support law as a collection tool.  In an ABC News report, a 39-year old 
Pennsylvania woman was described as “stunned” to learn that a nursing home was suing her for 
more than $300,000 (USD) in unpaid bills relating to her father and mother. The suit was 
eventually settled.142  In commenting on such suits, a national spokesperson for the long-term 
care industry implied that tightened reimbursement rules for Medicaid were squeezing nursing 
homes and thus requiring them to pursue all available options to cover expenses.143  In the same 
news story, an attorney who represented Pennsylvania nursing homes explained that he used 
Pennsylvania’s filial support laws to persuade adult children to do the paperwork necessary to 
establish Medicaid eligibility for their parents.144 This and other news articles suggest that even 
in Pennsylvania there is little public awareness or understanding of filial support laws, a fact that 
can lead to seemingly harsh or surprising results.  In January 2009, AARP published a nationally 
scoped article, concluding that “few people are aware that filial support laws exist.”145   
A fairly dramatic example of the modern trend was the May 2012 decision by Pennsylvania’s 
Superior Court in Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America (HCR) v. Pittas.146  In the case, 
an adult son was held liable for his mother’s outstanding debt for approximately six months of 
                                                     
140 See Recommendation and Report to the Pennsylvania Bar Association calling for repeals of Sections 4603 and 
4606 of Title 23 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated (also known as Act 43) (copy on file with the 
author), approved by the Pennsylvania Bar Association, as documented in the Bill Status Report for the 
Pennsylvania Bar Association at  http://www.pabar.org/public/legislative/Boxscore/bar_box.htm (last visited June 4, 
2012). 
141 Pennsylvania House Bill 321 (Printer’s No. 276) introduced in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in the 
Regular Session 2011-12. An earlier version of this bill, H.B. 2749 (Printer’s No. 4396), was introduced in 2006 and 
passed the House of Representatives by a large margin (191 to 4) before being blocked in the Senate when the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare opposed the repeal. See Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support 
Obligations in Pennsylvania: Adult Children, Parents, and Spouses, Chapter 14a, at pages 959-60, in ELDER LAW IN 
PENNSYLVANIA (Jeffrey A. Marshall ed., PBI Press, 3d ed. 2011). 
142 Alice Gomstyn, Pay Your Parents’ Bills or Else, ABC News (July 15, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=8074570&page=1#.T75vIr8lY6X. 
143 Alice Gomstyn, Pay Your Parents’ Bills or Else, ABC News (July 15, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=8074570&page=1#.T75vIr8lY6X (referencing comments made by David 
Hebert, AHCA's senior vice president for policy and government affairs). 
144 Alice Gomstyn, Pay Your Parents’ Bills or Else, ABC News (July 15, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=8074570&page=1#.T75vIr8lY6X. 
145 Beth Baker, Paying for Mom: Little Known Laws for Families to Fund Parents’ Care, AARP (January, 2009), 
http://www.aarp.org/relationships/caregiving/info-01-
2009/paying_for_momlittle_known_laws_force_families_to_fund_parents_care_.html. 
146 Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America v. Pittas, 2012 Pa. Super. 96, ___ A.3d ___, 2012 WL 1571830 (Pa. 
Super. 2012). 
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care in a nursing home, totaling close to $93,000.147 The court accepted the son’s argument on 
appeal that the nursing home, rather than the son, had the burden of establishing his “ability” to 
pay his indigent parent’s expenses;148however, the court concluded the burden was satisfied by 
introduction of joint tax returns, bank account statements and testimony that the son’s “net 
income was in excess of $85,000.00, and that he had recently paid-off a tax lien by making 
monthly payments of $1,100.00.”149  
The Superior Court also concluded that the son’s liability need not be stayed because of a 
pending application for Medicaid to cover the mother’s nursing home expenses,150 nor did the 
plaintiff have any obligation to join the mother’s husband or other siblings in the suit as 
additional or alternative sources of support.151  The court said it was applying the plain language 
of the law, observing that “while sympathetic with [son’s] obligation to support his mother 
without the assistance of this mother’s husband or her other children, we note that if [the son] 
had desired to share his support-burden, he was permitted to do so by joining those individuals in 
this case.”152 
The Superior Court decision in Pittas is significant because unlike the Budd case,153 where 
the daughter’s substantial potential liability for her mother’s accrued debt was tied to evidence 
showing the daughter’s own fault, there was no suggestion in the court opinion that the Pittas son 
was at fault in the accruing of the debt.  Further, while the court in the Savoy case had imposed 
liability on the son to cover his mother’s accrued debt, the dollar obligation was expressed in 
monthly sums of $150, to be paid over the course of future months, not as a lump sum of 
$10,000.154  By holding the son liable for a lump sum of close to $93,000 in the Pittas case, the 
Superior Court appears to confirm a significant tool for certain creditors of individuals who are 
unable to pay their debts personally, permitting the filial support statute to be applied 
retroactively to substantial accrued debt, without requiring evidence of fault on the part of the 
targeted family member.155  The award gives the nursing home potentially significant leverage in 
                                                     
147 Id.  The mother resided in the in the facility from sometime in September 2007 until March 2008 for assistance 
with on-going care needs following a car accident that injured herself and her husband. Id. at *1.  When the mother 
left the facility, she relocated to Greece with the assistance of her daughter, a Greek resident, leaving a “large 
portion of the bills incurred . . . due and owing to HCR.” Id.  Not documented or addressed in the Superior Court 
opinion, but described in the son’s brief on appeal, was a pending suit for medical malpractice in connection with 
the mother’s care, filed by the mother and her husband against the nursing home.  See Brief of Appellant, filed 
December 7, 2011, available at 2011 WL 7807578 at *6. 
148 Id, 2012 WL 1571830 at *3.  
149 Id., 2012 WL 1571830 at *3. 
150 Id. at *4. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at *4. 
153 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
154 Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
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collection.156  Nor does the dollar claim in Pittas appear to be unique, with, for example, trial 
court records demonstrating other pending cases seeking substantial sums.157   
 Unlike the single case example from Virginia,158 a decision rendered in Puerto Rico in 
2008,159 or the multiple, recent examples from Ukraine, where it was family members who were 
seeking direct support to benefit struggling parents, the cases in Pennsylvania demonstrate a 
growing pattern of commercial entities as plaintiffs, seeking the costs of care.  The Pennsylvania 
cases may predict a new focus for filial support laws, one that is significant in a nation of aging 
baby boomers.   
One other state, South Dakota, has reported similar case decisions.160  In 1998 the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota ruled that a hospital was entitled to void a transfer of real estate 
by the patient/father to his adult son on the ground the transfer was a fraudulent attempt to avoid 
the parents’ creditors.161  The court also ruled that the hospital could make a claim for payment 
against the son for the father’s health care debt under that state’s version of a filial support 
statute.162  A similar ruling in South Dakota, permitting a nursing home to collect the mother’s 
unpaid care costs from an adult child, was issued four years earlier.163 In that case the court 
                                                     
156 The Superior Court decision in Pittas did not address whether “support” awards can be applied properly to 
compel payment of pre-complaint debts.  See Commonwealth ex rel. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 163 A.2d 923 ( Pa. Super. 
1960) (holding that trial court’s order that son pay $150 to 65 year old father for debts predating the complaint was 
an improper, retroactive order); Commonwealth ex rel. Price v. Campbell, 119 A.2d 816 (Pa. Super. 1956) (holding 
that although evidence supported award of support from son to mother, that award should not operate retroactively).  
But see Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Forman, 243 A.2d 181 (Pa. Super. 1968) (observing that a third-party may seek 
future support, or, alternatively, may file an action for assumpsit, a type of implied contract claim, based on the 
statutory duty).  In addition, for claims for “medical assistance for the aged,” another question not addressed by the 
court in Pittas is whether a formula that appears to operate as a statutory cap on liability should have been applied.  
See 23 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. 4603 (b)(2) which provides that the amount of liability in any 12-month period must be 
the “lesser” of the actual cost, or “six times the excess of the liable individual’s average monthly income over the 
amount required for the reasonable support of the liable individual and other persons dependent upon the liable 
individual.” Id.  An example of the potential significance of this formula:  assuming the son’s annual after-tax 
income was $90,000 ($7,500 per month), and his “reasonable” support expenses for his wife and two children were 
as low as $3,500 per month, that would make the son’s maximum liability for a year’s worth of care = $24,000 
($4,000 per month of income in excess of reasonable expenses, multiplied by 6 months), significantly less than the 
close to $93,000 awarded).   See additional discussion of fundamental fairness issues at Katherine C. Pearson, Filial 
Support Obligations in Pennsylvania: Adult Children, Parents, and Spouses, in ELDER LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA 974-
977 (Jeffrey A. Marshall ed., PBI Press, 3d ed. 2011).   
157 HCR ManorCare Huntingdon Valley v. Santore, No. 10-22179 (Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, 
Montgomery County, available on the court’s document website at http://montcourt.org, and also available at 2010 
WL 3215949) (alleging son’s liability for more than $196,000).    
158 Peyton v. Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. 531, 531 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1978) (also available at 1978 Va. Cir. LEXIS 19). 
159 Discussed supra, at note ___ (currently 50).  See Chavez v. Hernandez et al., Civil Núm. KAL 2005–1188, 2008 
WL 5561018 (TCA), at *pg. #, (P.R. Cir. 2008).  
160 Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405 (S.D. 1998). 
161 Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405, 417 (S.D. 1998). 
162 Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405, 418 (S.D. 1998) (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
25-7-27 (West 2004)). 
163 Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566 (S.D. 1994). 
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found that the son had the ability to pay the bills from funds held in a trust, money he had 
inherited from his mother after her death.164 
Decisions such as those made by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in 2003165 and the 
South Dakota Supreme Court in 1998166 are usually generated by “gaps” in Medicare or 
Medicaid coverage.  Arguably these gaps could have been avoided with proper advice at the time 
of admission to the facilities.  Such rulings perhaps seem fair when the record demonstrates that 
the targeted defendant-child (a) was responsible for helping to create the gap, (b) manipulated 
the parent or the facility while helping him- or herself to the parent’s funds, or (c) simply 
benefitted from actions that moved the parent’s assets from out of the parent’s estate and into the 
child’s hands without payment of the debt of the parent.  The filial support cases that are more 
troubling, however, are those where it appears the adult child was targeted for no reason other 
than familial status and an unpaid, accrued debt. It is possible that harsh outcomes are simply the 
result of Pennsylvania’s simplistic statute, which does not define “indigency” and does not 
provide express factors, such as comparative equities or unclean hands of parties, as relevant to a 
determination of liability.167  Certainly, it seems clear that the larger the accrued debt of the 
parent, the greater the impact on the sandwiched generation, thus signaling the importance for 
statutory caps or limits on retroactive enforcement.  In Pennsylvania, as demonstrated by the 
Superior Court’s 1994 decision in Savoy and to an even greater extent in the 2012 decision in 
Pittas, enforcement of the plain language in surviving filial support laws can have harsh results, 
affecting both the individual and the larger family dynamic. 
VI. Challenges for Cross-Border Enforcement of Filial Support Laws in the U.S. 
As demonstrated in the attached Table and discussed in this article, only a portion of the 
states and territories of the U.S. have filial support laws that can be used to mandate that adult 
children must pay support for needy parents.   In the U.S., with its large, highly mobile national 
population, a key development favoring enforcement of child support and spousal support was 
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, also known as UIFSA.168  Further, for child support 
matters there is a growing, national system for interstate enforcement of state court rulings, 
mandated by specific federal law, including the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.169  However, the network may not apply to filial support laws when 
used against adult children.  Parties seeking interstate enforcement of state judgments against 
adult children would instead need to argue enforcement under the general Full Faith and Credit 
                                                     
164 Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566, 571 (S.D. 1994). 
165 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
166 Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405 (S.D. 1998). 
167 See e.g., Cal. Fam. Code §4404 (West 2004); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8 §712(f) (2009), (available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ar) (2009). 
168 Unif. Interstate Family Support Act, 9 Pt. IB U.L.A. 469 (1992); 9 Pt. IB U.L.A. 281 (1996); 9 Pt. IB 159 (2001); 
9 Pt. IB 72 (Supp. 2008). 
169 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2001). 
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language of federal law, including the Full Faith and Credit Act at 28 U.S.C. §1738, and Article 
IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution.170  
Further, states that have repealed or rejected filial support laws in their own states, have also 
ruled that out-of-state laws are unenforceable against adult children living within their borders.   
In State Welfare Commissioner v. Mintz, a New York court concluded that a Connecticut award 
of support for the indigent parent residing in Connecticut could not be enforced against the adult 
child living in New York because New York had repealed its filial support law in 1966.171  
Similarly, In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Mong, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to 
permit a Pennsylvania order compelling a son to support his father to be enforced in Ohio, 
recognizing a defense based on abandonment that was available under Ohio but not Pennsylvania 
law.172  Such rulings have not been tested under the Full Faith and Credit provisions of federal 
law. 
Such cases show the potential impact of a lack of national consensus in the United States 
about enforcement of filial support laws, a problem that does not exist in a smaller country with a 
single national law, such as Ukraine.  In the U.S., prior to changes in child support enforcement 
laws, the fact that parents who were determined to evade child support orders would cross state 
lines to avoid or delay enforcement, motivated law reformers to sanction “deadbeat” obligors 
nationally.173 In the U.S. there is no similar national consensus about enforcement of support 
orders for indigent parents against adult children.     
VII. Conclusion 
An uneven U.S. history of using filial support laws to compel adult children to provide 
financial support for their needy parents may represent conflicting -- or changing -- views over 
how to allocate public and private responsibility for helping the poor.   In the U.S. and Ukraine 
the language of the filial support statutes is similar, expressing a broad duty that many people 
would agree with on a moral basis, that children should support and assist their needy parents.  
The difference is in the willingness to use the statutes to mandate support against reluctant 
children. 
The differing current enforcement practices may in part reflect the difference in governance 
and economic pressures.  Ukraine was a core economic component of the Soviet Union, until it 
delivered the final nail in the coffin of the communist empire in December 1991, with close to 
90% of the Ukrainian population voting for independence.174  The country has both modernized 
                                                     
170 Russell J. Weintraub, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 363-67 (Foundation Press, 6th Ed. 2010) (citing 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. and Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2003)). 
171 State Welfare Commission v. Mintz, 280 N.Y.S. 2d 1007, 1010 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) 
172 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ohio 1954) 
173 Russell J. Weintraub, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 365 (Foundation Press, 6th Ed. 2010) 
174 Excellent English-language histories of Ukraine are available, including Anna Reid, BORDERLAND: A JOURNEY 
THROUGH THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE 224 (Westview Press, 2000) and Orest Subtelny, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 583 
(Univ. of Toronto, 4th ed., 2009). 
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and struggled with its emerging economy, weighed down by the legacy of the Chernobyl nuclear 
plant meltdown in 1986.175   Internal challenges for political control, including the so-called 
Orange Revolution in 2004, have continued, sometimes accompanied by allegations of fraud and 
corruption.176  The world-wide economic collapse of financial markets that began in 2008 hit the 
country hard, making it difficult for public welfare programs to provide an adequate safety net 
for the poor.177  Ukraine’s current willingness to enforce filial support laws against adult children 
may be a modern day echo of the Elizabethan-era Poor Laws, policies which were abandoned by 
England in the mid-twentieth century with the rise of its Welfare State.   
Comparison of recent enforcement practices among the U.S. states and Ukraine reveals at 
least five approaches: 
 Systematic enforcement of filial support in the form of predictable (and usually 
modest) monthly sums, used to relieve what appears to be fundamental poverty, 
usually triggered by direct requests for support made by the indigent elder or 
caregiving individuals (usually other family members), as demonstrated by the 
recent Ukrainian cases. 
 Episodic enforcement of filial support laws, targeting adult children who have 
benefited from self-directed transfers of family resources that could have been 
used to pay health care or long-term care providers, with the claimants being 
third-party, commercial care-givers, such as hospitals or nursing homes, as 
demonstrated by the cases in South Dakota178 and the Budd case179 in 
Pennsylvania.  
 Episodic enforcement of filial support laws of filial support laws, without regard 
to the defendant-child’s fault or lack thereof, used by commercial entities as debt 
collection tools, as demonstrated by the post-2005 reports of suits filed in 
Pennsylvania, including the  decision in the Pittas case.180 
 No significant attempts at enforcement, either on the part of needy elders, family 
members or commercial third-parties, as demonstrated by research in the states of 
Alaska, California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, 
                                                     
175 Orest Subtelny, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 619 (Univ. of Toronto, 4th ed., 2009). 
176 Id., at 636-39 (discussing the political climate and the Ukrainian presidential election of 2004). 
177 One estimate of poverty concludes that as of 2009, 35% of Ukraine’s population was below the poverty line.  
2012 CIA World Factbook, for Ukraine, available at http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/ukraine/ukraine_economy.html (last visited 
June 3, 2012).   
178 Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405 (S.D. 1998); Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. 
Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566 (S.D. 1994). 
179 Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
180 Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America v. Pittas, 2012 Pa. Super. 96, ___ A.3d ___, 2012 WL 1571830 (Pa. 
Super. 2012). 
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Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, and 
Rhode Island. 
 Formal rejection of filial support policies, as evidenced by the repeal of statutory 
law, occurring in Idaho in 2011.  
There may be a sixth approach, although it is one more difficult to document in this article 
with objective research.  The author served as the director of the Elder Protection Clinic at 
Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson School of Law from 2001 to 2012, in which law 
students working as certified legal interns represented older adults on a wide range of legal 
matters.  A number of the matters arose from financial abuse or exploitation, sometimes at the 
hands of adult children, usually involving the parent’s home transferred in exchange for an 
unfulfilled promise of care.  One of the tools used by the Clinic to combat financial abuse of an 
elderly parent by an adult child was to present the child with the option:  pay monthly support for 
the remainder of the impoverished elder’s life as required by Pennsylvania’s filial support law, or 
return the house.181     
  It seems reasonable to conclude that when a nation is both willing and financially able to 
provide adequate public support to assist poor elders, filial support laws are less important and 
less frequently used.  In the United States, when the federal government was willing to fully fund 
Medicare and Medicaid for elders’ health care and long-term care in nursing homes, federal 
policies led states to repeal or limit the use of filial support laws to mandate financial support for 
parents by their adult children.  However, as the large demographic cohort of baby boomers ages, 
thus increasing the likelihood of costly health care and long-term care, there may be heightened 
interest among the U.S. states in using filial support laws against adult children. 
In Ukraine, research of cases decided from 2004 forward demonstrates that filial support 
laws are used in a direct manner to mandate that adult children share their income with their 
needy parents. Some of the cases demonstrate that application of the law against a brother or 
sister may also serve to relieve disproportionate financial burdens voluntarily assumed by one 
child, often the child who is physically or emotionally closer to the parent.  On the other hand, 
while the proportion of the child’s income allocated to support of parents by court orders may be 
significant and thus may be seen by the adult child as a harsh burden, the total amounts of money 
awarded is fairly low.  Are the sums enough to relieve economic hardship for the parent without 
creating economic hardship for the adult child?   The opportunity for the author of this article to 
comment on Ukrainian law is narrow and is based on limited research.  Nonetheless, two 
potential concerns emerge from the Ukrainian research:  whether the dollar benefit of 
enforcement of filial support laws ever outweighs the enforcement costs, and whether policy-
makers adequately consider the potential impact of enforcement on the larger family dynamic.  
                                                     
181 The Clinic experiences are documented in the author’s book, co-written with Trisha Cowart.  See Katherine C. 
Pearson & Trisha A. Cowart, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION (Bisel Publ. Co. 2011), with 
Chapter 6 covering the use of filial support laws in Pennsylvania. 
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These same concerns may exist for any U.S. state tempted to commit to modern-era enforcement 
of filial support laws.  
In the United States, filial support laws have not been used frequently in recent years to 
require adult children to provide direct financial assistance to needy parents.  However, as 
demonstrated by the recent history of decisions and cases filed in Pennsylvania and South 
Dakota, where third-party claims for support of parents are permitted, the sums of money 
involved can be very large.  The facts of these cases sometimes demonstrate fraud, manipulation, 
or other fault on the part of the adult child, and as one commentator observes, “enforcement . . . 
may be appropriate in egregious individual situations,”182 but in most states filial support laws do 
not require proof of such fault.  Are filial support laws being used to avoid proof requirements 
for fraud or other-fault based theories of recovery?  And what does that mean for “innocent” 
defendant-family members who are sued for huge arrearages in long-term care or health costs?  
In the U.S., filial support statutes are not currently tied to “fault” grounds and thus comparatively 
“innocent,” if estranged, adult children could become subject to claims for substantial care costs 
for their parents.  
  Significantly, in the United States, filial support laws are not well known or understood by 
the general public in the 21st Century.  The inconsistency in the laws among the U.S. states, the 
episodic nature of enforcement during the last fifty years, and the evidence of a new trend of 
third-party enforcement of filial support laws by debt collectors, raise important concerns, 
including the question of whether filial support laws are serving appropriate public policy goals 
in the United States.  
 
                                                     
182 Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations, 9 JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
POLICY 709, 731 (2001). 
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FILIAL SUPPORT STATUTES in the UNITED STATES 
Updated June 7, 2012 
 
STATE STATUTE MOST RECENT CASES RELEVANT TO ISSUE 
OF ADULT CHILD’S LIABILITY FOR  
SUPPORT OF PARENT 
Alabama No Current Statute  
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 25.20.030 (Duty of 
parent & child when poor) 
Alaska Stat. § 47.25.230 (Persons 
liable for support and burial) 
Alaska Stat. §  11.51.210  (Crime) 
 
Arizona No Current Statute  
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 20-47-106 (Duty 
limited to mental health services) 
Alcorn v Ark. State Hospital, 367 S.W.2d 737 (Ark. Supreme 1963) 
(decided under prior law, discussing limits on secondary liability of 
family member (father) for costs of mental health care to family 
member (adult daughter) in state hospital) 
Stewart v. Stewart, 1990 WL 48886 (Ark. App. 1990) (dicta, 
discussing parents’ financial liability for mentally disabled adult son) 
California Cal. Fam. Code 4400-4405 (Duty to 
Support Parents) 
Cal. Fam. Code 4410-4414 (Relief 
from Duty to Support Parents) 
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §& 12350 
& 12351(Including Releases of 
Obligation to Reimburse State) 
Cal. Penal Code § 270(c) (Crime) 
Swoap v. Superior Ct. of Sacramento Co., 516 P.2d 840 (Cal. 1973) 
(decided under prior version of statute, holding statutory duty of 
children to support needy parents and reimburse state for support is 
constitutional and does not deny equal protection of laws) 
People v. Heizman, 886 P.2d 1229 (Cal. 1994)(discussing filial duties 
in context of criminal case of elder abuse filed against adult daughter) 
Colorado No Current Statute In re Marriage of Sendinsky, 740 P.2d 521 (Colo. 1987) (discussing 
impact of voluntary contributions by adult children to mother in 
divorce) 
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-304 
(Crime, for refusing reasonable 
necessary support to parent under 
age 65) 
 
Delaware Del. Code Ann. Tit. 13 § 503 (Duty 
to support poor person includes 
spouse, parents & children). 
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 13 § 506 (Just 
cause defense to failure to support) 
Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Del. 1992)(holding debt 
collectors not entitled to misrepresent effect of statute in attempting 
to collect deceased parents’ debts from adult children) 
Florida No Current Statute  
Georgia GA. Code Ann. § 36-12-3 (Children  
of full age shall support  paupers) 
Davenport v. Davenport,  111 S.E. 2d 57 (Ga. 1959) (declining to 
permit wife/mother to seek both spousal support and support from 
children) 
Hawaii No Current Statute  
Idaho No Current Statute Idaho Code § 32-1002 was repealed effective  July 1, 2011 
Illinois No Current Statute  
Indiana Ind. Code Ann. §§ 31-16 -17-1 thru 
7 (Liability of children for support 
of parents & contribute to burials) 
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-46-1-7 (Crime) 
Pickett v. Pickett, 251 N.E.2d 684  (Ind. App. 1969) (upholding 
obligation of son to support mother under prior version of statute) 
Davis v. State, 240 N.E.2d 54  (Ind. 1968) (holding son’s gainful 
employment did not mean son was able to support mother under prior 
version of statute) 
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 252.1 (Defining 
“poor” person) 
Iowa Code Ann. § 252.2(Liability) 
Iowa Code Ann. § 252.5 (Remote 
relatives - Grandparents) 
 
Professor Katherine C. Pearson 
The Pennsylvania State University 
The Dickinson School of Law 
Kansas No Current Statute In re Erikson, 180 P.263 (Kan. 1919) (no statute; no duty) 
Kentucky KY. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 530.050 
(Crime) 
Wood v. Wheat, 11 S.W. 2d 916  (Ky. Ct. App. 1928) (Child 
voluntarily providing support cannot compel contribution from other 
children) 
Louisiana La. C.C. Art. 229 (Reciprocal 
duties; parents & children) 
La. C.C. Art. 239 (Reciprocal 
duties; illegitimate children) 
La. R.S. 13: 4731 (Alimony from 
children or grandchildren) 
In re Succession of Elie, 50 So. 3d 262 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (denying 
mother’s claims for funds from deceased son’s estate under Art. 229) 
Maine No Current Statute  
Maryland MD. Code Ann. Fam. Law §§ 13-
101 thru 13-109 (Support claims by 
destitute parent or adult children) 
 
Corby v. McCarthy, 840 A.2d 188 (Md. 2003)(recognizing parents’ 
duty to support adult disabled child) 
 
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 273, § 20 
(Crime) 
 
Michigan No Current Statute  
Minnesota No Current Statute  
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 43-31-25 
(Liability of parents, grandparents, 
brothers & sisters) 
 
Missouri No Current Statute Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. App. 1978) (no statute; no duty) 
Montana Montana Code Ann. § 40-6-214 
(Reciprocal duties of parents & 
children) 
Montana Code Ann. § 40-6-301 
(Duty to support indigent parents) 
In re Marriage of Howard, 840 P.2d 1217 (Mont. 1992)(holding that 
in calculating father’s liability for child support, court did not have to 
deduct sums voluntarily paid by him to his mother, absent showing 
mother was indigent) 
Nebraska No Current Statute  
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 428.070 
(Child’s duty to reimburse for 
county hospitalization of indigent 
parents, where child promised to 
support parent in writing) 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §439B.310 
(Defining indigent) 
 
New Hampshire N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 167:2 
(Reimbursement to state or county 
for public assistance to parent) 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 546-A:2 
(Liability of spouses, parent, child 
for reasonable subsistence) 
 
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 44:4-100 thru 
44:4-103 (Liability of parents, 
spouses and children of poor 
persons) 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 44:1-139 thru 
44:1-142 (Compelling assistance 
from relatives including children) 
Terenzio v. Nelson, 258 A.2d 20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) 
(permitting cross-border enforcement of prior New York law to 
recover mother’s hospitalizations costs from N.J. son) 
Pavlick v. Teresinski, 149 A.2d 300 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. 1959) 
(upholding mother’s claim against two sons). 
New Mexico No Current Statute  
New York No Current Statute Matter of Will of Surut, 535 N.Y.S. 2d 922 (N.Y. Sur. 1988) 
(daughter had no duty to support mother) 
In re Mintz, 280 N.Y.S 2d 1007 (N.Y. Sup. 1967)(declining to 
enforce out-of-state filial law against in-state child) 
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-326.1 (Crime)  
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-10 Trinity Medical Ctr. v. Rubbelke, 389 N.W. 2d 805 (N.D. 1986) 
(holding medical center’s release of parents also released children of 
(Reciprocal duties of parents and 
child; promise of adult child to pay 
for necessaries furnished to parent is 
binding) 
any obligation under statute).  
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §  2919.21 
(Crime) 
State v. Flontek, 693 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio 1998) (reversing conviction 
of daughter for manslaughter & nonsupport of her mother) 
St. Clare Center, Inc. v. Mueller, 517 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio Ct. 
App.1986) (holding statute criminalizing failure to provide support 
for parent does not create civil liability counterpart) 
Oklahoma No Current Statute  
Oregon OR. Rev. Stat § 109.010 (Duty of 
support for children and parents) 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.205 (Crime) 
In re Estate of Hines, 573 P.2d 1260 (Or. 1978) (discussing filial 
support statute in wrongful death claim, finding statute does not make 
parents dependents of child) 
State v. Nolen, 260 P.3d 810 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that in 
absence of agreement between mother and son, son had no duty to 
care for mother and therefore no liability for failing to provide her 
with care) 
Pennsylvania 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 4601 thru 4606 
(Duty of parents to indigent child 
and child to indigent parents) 
 
Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. Super. 1994) (holding son 
liable for  $150 per month to pay mother’s hospital expenses) 
Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066 (Pa. Super. 2003) 
(holding statute may be used by nursing home to seek recovery from 
adult daughter who misused power of attorney and failed to use 
mother’s money to pay for care) 
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America v. Pittas, 2012 Pa. 
Super. 96, ___ A.3d ___, 2012 WL 1571830 (Pa. Super. 2012) 
(holding son liable to nursing home for $93,000 for mother’s six 
months of care)  
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-10-1 thru 15-
10-7 (Penalty for unreasonable 
neglect of destitute parents) 
R.I. Gen. Laws §§  40-5-13 thru  
40-5-21 (Obligation of kindred for 
support) 
Landmark Med.Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1994) 
(upholding medical center’s claim against wife and children for 
expenses incurred by wife and husband before his death, and children 
would be liable under both sets of statutes if mother’s assets 
insufficient to cover debt). 
South Carolina No Current Statute  
South Dakota S.D. Codified Law § 25-7-27 (Adult 
child’s duty to support parent) 
S.D. Codified Law § 25-7-28 (Right 
of contribution from brothers and 
sisters) 
S.D. Codified Laws § 28-13-
1.1(Defining “indigent or poor 
person”) 
Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405 
(S.D.1998) (holding hospital entitled to make statutory claim against 
son for father’s health care debt, where real estate transfer deemed 
fraud) 
Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566 (S.D. 1994) 
(permitting mother’s nursing home to make statutory claim against 
son to be paid from trust funds inherited from mother) 
Accounts Management Inc. v. Nelson, 663 N.W. 2d 237 (S.D. 2003) 
(holding that where hospital’s patient (or his estate) was able to 
provide for himself, the children of the deceased patient were not 
obliged to pay).  
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-103 
(Definition of responsible parties 
includes children) 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-115 
(Welfare Department may require 
reimbursement from responsible 
parties)  
 
Texas No Current Statute Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Fierce, 519 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1975)(Son had no legal obligation to parent) 
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 17-14-2 (Support 
of Poor by Relatives: children; 
parents, brothers and sisters, 
grandchildren, grandparents) 
 
Vermont VT. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15, §§ 202 & 
203 (Penalties for nonsupport) 
 
Virginia VA. Code Ann. § 20-88 (Support of 
parents by children) 
Peyton v. Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. 531, 1978 Va. Cir. Lexis 19 (1978) 
(holding son liable to reimburse brother for mother’s past care 
expenses) 
Washington No Current Statute  
Wisconsin No Current Statute  
Wyoming No Current Statute  
West Virginia W. VA. Code § 9-5-9 (Liability of 
relatives for support, including 
children, parents, brothers & sisters) 
 
Puerto Rico 8 L.P.R.A. § 712 (Duty of 
descendants to the elderly 
(translated from Spanish) )  
Chavez v. Hernandez et al., Civil Núm. KAL 2005–1188, 2008 WL 
5561018 (TCA) (P.R. Cir. 2008) (holding four siblings liable equally 
to pay for mother’s care, totaling $1,800 per month plus retroactive 
payments of $19,000).  
District of 
Columbia 
No Current Statute   
 
